Perhaps it is because of the complained-of secrecy surrounding the the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but I have had a hard time forming concrete arguments either pro or con regarding the TPP. Indeed, most of my trepidation surrounding the TPP is based on process type objections and a general distrust from prior trade agreements. For anyone else interested in a potentially smart explanation of the situation - in a broader historical context - I think R. Taggart Murphy has a very worthwhile read at HuffPost titled:
"How the U.S. and Japan Are Opening Markets to Contain China," that cites to a longer, equally worthwhile piece in Salon titled:
"The real story behind Shinzo Abe’s visit: China, TPP and what the media won’t tell you about this state visit."
Both should be read by anyone interested in the subject. For one thing, both pieces discuss the history of the immediate post-WWII relationship between the U.S. and Japan that I, frankly, was unaware of. For example, the Salon piece addresses Nobusuke Kiishi - the last Japanese premiere to address a joint session of Congress (in 1960) before the address last week by Japan’s current prime minister Shinzo Abe:
There are a few things to note about Kiishi. He officiated during Japan’s brutal pacification of Manchuria in the 1930s, served as minister of munitions during World War II, and was charged in 1945 as a Class A war criminal, an international designation for those who planned and initiated war crimes as opposed to simply executing them.
Kiishi was released without trial in 1948, not because he was innocent but because Washington was just then “reversing course” in Japan—that is, determining that the Cold War took precedence over matters such as justice. With his election in 1957, Japan had a war criminal in the prime minister’s office; Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers could hardly get enough of this bribery-prone murderer.
Kiishi’s key moment came in the spring of 1960. The Japanese public and much of the Diet were in an uproar over a new security treaty with Washington, known as ANPO; Kiishi had already signed it but still needed parliamentary ratification. Late in the evening of May 19, Kiishi had opposing Diet members forcibly removed from the legislative chamber and rammed through a favorable vote on ANPO with the minority that supported it.
I have always put this among the crystallizing moments of the postwar relationship between Washington and Tokyo. The subversion of democratic process has been essential to maintaining Japan’s place in the Cold War’s Pacific theater most of the time since that evening.
One other thing you need to know about Kiishi: He is Shinzo Abe’s grandfather. And let there be no question: Abe honors the impeccable bloodlines, an extreme-right nationalist in all he does.
Both authors describe a post-WWII history in which the U.S. fostered, and imposed, a fundamentally undemocratic government on Japan as a bulwark against the perceived threat of the Soviet Union/Communism, and that international trade played a large role from the start. As Mr. Murphy explains:
Trade issues form another curious echo last week of Kishi's 1960 trip. Kishi's LDP had argued with Washington that if Japan's voters were not to turn left, they had to be able to earn enough dollars to purchase essential imports. The Eisenhower administration agreed; Japanese companies were allowed to sell anything they could make into the U.S. without reciprocal privileges for American firms in Japan. The result worked wonderfully for Japan for some decades, if less so for American workers. But it did leave certain sectors of the Japanese economy -- agriculture, construction, distribution -- cosseted from competition and thus something of a drag on overall productivity.
Moving forward, both authors argue that the TPP must be understood as an effort to "re-cement" (if you will) the U.S.-Japan political/military relationship along the same continuing lines, but this time as a strategic effort directed against the perceived threat of China/Communism. According to this argument, the ramifications of TPP are much broader and include both the U.S. inserting itself more directly in enduring Japan-China disputes as well as a concerted effort by the U.S. to increase Japan's offensive military capabilities, contrary to Japan's constitution, albeit under U.S. direction and control:
But unlike his grandfather who had to return to a country simmering with rage at his having delivered Japan into the arms of the U.S. military as a protectorate in perpetuity, Abe can crow to his right wing base that he has finally released the shackles that have bound Japan's military since 1945 -- all the while procuring American backing in any confrontation with China.
For its part, the American national security state got what it has wanted for decades out of Japan -- "interoperability", to use the Pentagon's favorite buzzword, which translates into the ability to fold Japan's euphemistically termed "Self Defense Forces" into American military planning without having to worry about any Japanese legal restriction.
Again, I can't vouch for either authors' take, but the articles are provocative and seemingly better informed than any coverage I read in today's mainstream press. And if the authors are correct, then the TPP debate raises many additional, important issues that also aren't being publicly discussed.